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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Warren was indicted on charges of intent to distribute 
fifty or more grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and possession of a 
firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  He filed a pretrial motion 
to, inter alia, suppress evidence allegedly obtained in 
violation of his Miranda rights.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 471 (1966).  The District Court granted Warren‟s 
motion in part, as to statements Warren made at his home to 
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his state parole agent, but denied it as to statements Warren 
made at the police station after receiving the Miranda 
warning.  Warren appeals this ruling.  We will affirm. 
   
 Warren later entered into a plea agreement in which he 
pleaded guilty to the drug charge.  In this agreement, the 
government states that it will refrain from filing, pursuant to 
21 U.S.C. § 851, an information to increase the penalty based 
upon a prior conviction.  On appeal, Warren contends that the 
government breached this provision of the agreement.  We 
will dismiss the breach of plea agreement claim.  
  
I. 
 We will first address the Miranda issue.
1
  At the police 
station, Warren signaled that he wished to talk.  The police 
officer‟s testimony at the suppression hearing gives an 
account of what happened next.   
 
I told [Warren] that he had the 
right to remain silent.  Anything 
you say can and will be used 
against you in a court of law.  
You have the right to an attorney.  
If you cannot afford to hire an 
attorney, one will be appointed to 
represent you without charge 
                                              
1
 “This Court reviews the District Court's denial of a motion 
to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual 
findings and exercises plenary review of the District Court's 
application of the law to those facts.”  United States v. Perez, 
280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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before any questioning if you 
wish.  Should you decide to talk 
to me, you can stop the 
questioning any time. 
 
Suppression Hearing 12, ECF No. 60.  The record makes 
clear that the officer did not read this warning from a card, 
but rather recited it from memory.  Warren does not challenge 
the accuracy of the officer‟s testimony.  Instead, Warren 
argues that the officer‟s testimony evinces a deficient 
Miranda warning because it failed to advise him of his right 
to an attorney after questioning commenced.  
 
 The Supreme Court stated in Miranda, that authorities 
are obligated to advise a person taken into custody of  “the 
right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him 
during interrogation.”  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471.  Yet, in the 
years since Miranda, the Supreme Court has consistently 
refrained from constructing a particular formula for the 
warning.  In Duckworth, the Court held the following.  
  
Reviewing courts are not required 
to examine Miranda warnings as 
if construing a will or defining the 
terms of an easement.  The 
inquiry is simply whether the 
warnings reasonably “conve[y] to 
[a suspect] his rights as required 
by Miranda.” 
 
Duckworth v. Eagan,  492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (quoting 
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361 (1981)).  The Court 
 5 
 
recently reaffirmed this standard in Florida v. Powell, 130 S. 
Ct. 1195, 1198 (U.S. 2010).
 2
   
 
 After Powell was arrested, but before the Tampa, 
Florida, police questioned him, an officer recited the Miranda 
warning from a pre-printed card.  The officer told Powell, 
inter alia, “[y]ou have the right to talk to a lawyer before 
answering any of our questions” and then that Powell had 
“the right to use any of these rights at any time you want 
during this interview.”  Id. at 1197.  At issue was whether the 
lack of any specific reference to Powell‟s right to an attorney 
during questioning rendered statements he made during the 
interview inadmissible.  Powell argued that Miranda was 
clear in its requirement that a person in custody must be 
advised of the right to counsel during questioning.  He 
asserted that, by qualifying the language about counsel with 
the phrase “before answering any of our questions” the 
warning was deficient because it communicated that his right 
terminated when questioning began.  The Supreme Court 
disagreed.
 
 
 
 Miranda requires that a suspect be informed of the 
right to have counsel present during questioning.  Miranda, 
384 at 471.  Yet, as was highlighted in questioning by Justice 
                                              
2
 The warning at issue in Prysock was the following.  The 
suspect had “the right to talk to a lawyer before you are 
questioned, have him present with you while you are being 
questioned, and all during the questioning . . . .”  Prysock, 
453 U.S. at 356.  In Duckworth, the police said the following.  
“[Y]ou have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we 
ask you any questions, and to have him with you during 
questioning.”  Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198 (italics omitted). 
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Ginsburg at oral argument, Miranda regarded the warning 
used at that time by the Federal Bureau of Investigation—
which did not explicitly state any right to counsel at the time 
of questioning—as consistent with its holding.  Oral 
Argument at 6:20, Id. at 483 (No. 08-1175), available at  
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2009/2009_08_1175.  
That warning was characterized in Miranda as stating the 
following.   
 
[The person in custody] is not 
required to make a statement, that 
any statement may be used 
against him in court, that the 
individual may obtain the services 
of an attorney of his own choice 
and . . . that he has a right to free 
counsel if he is unable to pay.   
 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 483.  The Court went on to state that 
this warning could be “emulated by state and local 
enforcement agencies.”  Id. at 486.  Therefore, it cannot be 
said that the Miranda court regarded an express reference to 
the temporal durability of this right as elemental to a valid 
warning.  Rather, as the Powell decision underscores in 
quoting Prysock, attention must be focused upon whether 
anything in the warning „“suggested any limitation on the 
right to the presence of appointed counsel different from the 
clearly conveyed rights to a lawyer in general, including the 
right to a lawyer before [the suspect is] questioned, . . . while 
[he is] being questioned, and all during the questioning.‟”  
Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204 (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360-
361) (internal quotation marks in Prysock omitted) (emphasis 
added).   
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 Powell argued that the warning he received contained 
such a limitation because it informed him that he had a right 
to counsel “before questioning.”   The Court, however, did 
not regard this language as fatal to the validity of the warning 
for two reasons.  First, the “before” language, which is similar 
to the language of Duckworth, “merely conveyed when 
Powell‟s right to an attorney became effective-namely, before 
he answered any questions at all.”  Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 
1205.
3
  Including these additional words did not vitiate the 
essential information given to the suspect that a right to 
counsel exists.  Additionally, the Powell court took note of a 
“catch all” statement included in the warning at issue, to wit:  
“[you] have the right to use any of these rights at any time 
you want during this interview.”  Id. at 1201.  Therefore, the 
Powell court said, “[i]n combination, the two warnings 
reasonably conveyed Powell's right to have an attorney 
present, not only at the outset of interrogation, but at all 
times.”  Id. at 1205.  Elaborating upon its assessment of the 
term “reasonably conveyed,” the Court said the following. 
 
A reasonable suspect in a 
custodial setting who has just 
been read his rights, we believe, 
would not come to the 
counterintuitive conclusion that 
he is obligated, or allowed, to hop 
in and out of the holding area to 
                                              
3
 The Court also concluded that these words responded 
merely to a typical question that a suspect might have after 
receiving a Miranda warning:  when might counsel be 
appointed?  Id. at 1204 (citing Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 204).   
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seek his attorney's advice.  
Instead, the suspect would likely 
assume that he must stay put in 
the interrogation room and that 
his lawyer would be there with 
him the entire time. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  Importantly, the Court concluded that 
the warning was sufficient because “[n]othing in the words 
used indicated that counsel's presence would be restricted 
after the questioning commenced.”  Id. at 1205 (emphasis 
added).  
 
  Turning to the warning used in this case, we note 
that—unlike Powell—the police officer warned Warren of his 
right to counsel without any reference to whether it 
commenced or ceased at any particular time.  Warren was 
told in a straightforward manner:  “[y]ou have the right to an 
attorney.”  Therefore, it cannot be said that the instant 
warning explicitly stated a temporally-limited right to 
counsel.  Yet, in light of Powell, we find it necessary to 
address whether the lack of any express reference to the right 
to counsel during interrogation, coupled with the lack of a 
“catch all” statement like that used in Powell, undermines the 
validity of the warning.  We conclude that it does not.  
  
 As a starting point, it is of interest that the officer‟s 
Miranda statement on the right to counsel here is remarkably 
similar to the warning used by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, which was regarded by the Miranda court as 
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consistent with its holding.  384 U.S. at 483.
4
  As noted 
earlier, that warning did not make any mention of the right to 
an attorney during questioning.  While not dispositive, this 
observation is instructive since our analysis turns upon 
whether the officer‟s statement in this case “reasonably 
conveyed” the rights set out in Miranda.  
 
 Warren asserts that the warning could be reasonably 
interpreted only as limiting his right to counsel.  Unlike 
Powell, Warren offers no rationale for a reasonable person‟s 
belief that the clear, unmodified statement “[y]ou have the 
right to an attorney” would be regarded as time-limited.   
 
 We note that the officer did, next, state “[i]f you 
cannot afford to hire an attorney one will be appointed to 
represent you without charge before any questioning if you 
wish.”  Yet, we do not find that such a statement—referring 
only to the appointment of pro bono counsel on his behalf—
can be reasonably interpreted to modify the prior, unqualified 
declaration of his general right to counsel.
5
   
                                              
4
 We are aware that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has 
changed its warning to state that the person in custody has the 
right to counsel before any questions are asked and also to 
have counsel present during questioning.  Powell, 130 S. Ct. 
at 1206.  However, as the Powell Court stated, “[t]his advice 
is admirably informative, but we decline to declare its precise 
formulation necessary to Miranda’s requirements.  Id. 
 
 
5
 See United States v. Frankson, 83 F.3d 79, 82 (4
th
 Cir. 
1996). (“Given the common sense understanding that an 
unqualified statement lacks qualifications, all that police 
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 Moreover, it is counterintuitive to conclude from this 
warning that while the general right to counsel is unrestricted, 
the right to appointed counsel exists only in the moments 
prior to questioning and ceases the moment that the interview 
commences.  Again, the officer said:  “[i]f you cannot afford 
to hire an attorney, one will be appointed to represent you 
without charge before any questioning if you wish.”  Like 
Powell and Duckworth, we read the officer‟s words as 
indicating merely that Warren‟s right to pro bono counsel 
became effective before he answered any questions.  Powell, 
130 S. Ct. at 1205.  It does not restrict the right to counsel, 
but rather addresses when the right to appointed counsel is 
triggered.  See Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 204.  Taken as a 
whole, then, the warning reasonably conveys the substance of 
the rights expressed in Miranda. 
 
 With that said, as in Powell, we do not regard the 
warning delivered in this case as the “clearest possible” 
                                                                                                     
officers need do is convey the general rights enumerated in 
Miranda.”);  U.S. v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496, 502 (8th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 65 (1992)(“When the only 
claimed deficiency is that of generality, the teaching of 
Duckworth that we are not construing a will or defining the 
terms of an easement convinces us that we cannot hold the 
warning in this case amounts to plain error.”); United States 
v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357, 361-362 (7
th
 Cir. 1973) (The warning 
was sufficient in which officers stated that the suspect had 
“the right to remain silent, right to counsel, and if they 
haven‟t got funds to have counsel, that the court will see that 
they are properly defended.”). 
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statement that could be given.  Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1205.  
Moreover, the fact that this exchange occurred in the police 
station—a setting where a card imprinted with the Miranda 
warning should be readily available—is disconcerting, 
considering the resources that have been expended to 
consider a claim that could have been preempted with 
minimal care and effort.  Nonetheless, we examine the 
warning objectively within the totality of the circumstances.  
Id.  From this perspective, we conclude, as in Powell, that 
“[n]othing in the words used indicated that counsel's presence 
would be restricted after the questioning commenced.”  Id.  
Therefore, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
 
II. 
 We now turn to the breach of plea agreement claim.
6
  
Warren admitted to his career offender status at the change of 
plea hearing, and neither the maximum statutory sentence 
(life imprisonment) or the Guidelines range attributable to his 
crack cocaine offense (292 to 365 months) is disputed.
 7
  
                                              
6
 In determining whether the Government has breached its 
plea agreement with a defendant, we apply the de novo 
standard of review.  United States v. Rivera, 357 F.3d 290, 
293-94 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 
7
 The plea agreement stipulates the following.  “JERMAIN 
ANTWON WARREN and the United States Attorney further 
understand and agree to the following:  1. The penalty that 
may be imposed upon JERMAIN ANTWON WARREN is:  
(a)  A term of imprisonment of not less than ten years to a 
maximum of life . . . .”  Plea Agreement § C.1.(a),  ECF No. 
55.  Moreover, at oral argument Warren conceded that the 
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Rather, Warren has argued that the District Court should use 
the Guidelines relating to a powder cocaine offense, yielding 
a range—he asserts—of 168 to 210 months.   
 
 At the sentencing hearing, the government disagreed 
with the range stated by Warren noting that, with Warren‟s 
career offender status, the applicable range would be 210 to 
262 months.  Warren alleges that the government‟s argument 
constituted breach of the plea agreement, in which the 
government agreed not to file an information pursuant to 21 
U.S.C. § 851.
8
  Warren‟s argument confuses the issue.   
 
 It is irrelevant to the breach of plea agreement analysis 
that the government disagreed with Warren‟s argument.  
Warren argued for the application of a powder cocaine 
Guidelines range.  The point of reference here is the 
undisputed sentencing range applicable to Warren‟s crack 
cocaine offense.  See United States v. Whitaker, 938 F.2d 
1551, 1552 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] § 851(a)(1) notice is required 
only where the statutory minimum or maximum penalty 
under Part D of Title 21 is sought to be enhanced, not where a 
defendant, by virtue of his criminal history, receives an 
increased sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines within 
                                                                                                     
Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months was applicable to the 
crack cocaine offense. 
 
8
 “The United States Attorney agrees not to file an 
information, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, stating prior 
convictions as a basis for increased punishment.”  Plea 
Agreement § B.4., ECF No. 55. 
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the statutory range.”).9  Warren concedes that the government 
did not file an information under section 851 to increase the 
crack cocaine sentence based upon prior convictions.   
Finally, as a factual matter, the District Court sentenced 
Warren to 248 months, below the recommended range.  
  
 We, therefore, conclude that Warren‟s assertion of the 
government‟s breach of the plea agreement is meritless.  
Accordingly, we will enforce the appellate waiver provision 
of the agreement and dismiss this claim.  Plea Agreement § 
A.8, ECF No. 55.  
 
III. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the order 
of the District Court denying Warren‟s motion to suppress, 
and we will dismiss the remaining breach of plea agreement 
issue. 
                                              
9
 At the sentencing hearing, the District Court considered and 
rejected Warren‟s request to use the powder cocaine 
Guidelines range as the basis to calculate the sentence, stating 
“even if it were correct, I would consider it under these 
circumstances to be substantially inadequate, given this 
Defendant‟s background.”  Sentencing Hearing 39, ECF No. 
73. The District Court, instead, determined that the disparity 
between sentencing for crack cocaine and powder cocaine 
was appropriately considered, within the District Court‟s 
discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as one of a 
“constellation of factors” to support a mitigative variance 
from the Guidelines range.  Id. at 38. 
1 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting in part,
1
 
 
Ernesto Miranda lived an unremarkable life, but his 
surname stands for what has become one of our most 
fundamental constitutional rights.  Indeed, Miranda has 
become embedded in our national culture.  See Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-44 (2000).  The majority 
concludes that a police warning to a suspect in custody, given 
from memory at a station house, of his “right to an attorney,” 
and right to an appointed attorney “before any questioning” 
satisfies the Miranda requirement to inform him of his right to 
counsel at all times throughout questioning.  For the reasons 
that follow, and because I believe that Miranda and the 
Supreme Court‟s most recent iterations require more, I 
respectfully dissent.   
 
Miranda repeatedly emphasizes the importance of 
informing a suspect in custody of the right to counsel during 
questioning.  It requires, as recognized by the Supreme Court 
in Florida v. Powell, 130 S.Ct. 1195 (2010), that “as an 
absolute prerequisite to interrogation,” an individual held for 
questioning “must be clearly informed that he has the right to 
consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during 
interrogation.”   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 
(1966).  The Court found this “right to have counsel present 
at [an] interrogation . . . indispensable to the protection of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege.”  Id.  The Court‟s “aim [wa]s to 
assure that the individual‟s right to choose between silence 
and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation 
                                                 
1 
I join Part II of the majority opinion, the 21 U.S.C. § 851 
analysis, in full.   
 
2 
 
process.”  Id. at 471.  Thus, the practical right to the presence 
of an attorney addresses the concern that “[t]he circumstances 
surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly 
to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his 
privilege [to remain silent] by his interrogators.”  Powell, 130 
S.Ct. at 1203 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 
As Powell recognized, the Court has not “dictated the 
words in which the essential information must be conveyed.”  
Id. at 1204.  In reviewing Miranda warnings, courts are “not 
required to examine Miranda warnings as if construing a will 
or defining the terms of an easement.”  Duckworth v. Eagan, 
492 U.S. 195, 204 (1989).  The inquiry, according to 
Duckworth, California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981), and 
Powell, “is simply whether the warnings reasonably conve[y] 
to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.”  Powell, 130 
S.Ct. at 1204 (quoting Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203) (citations 
and quotation marks omitted).  
  
In Powell, the Supreme Court‟s most recent iteration 
of Miranda, the Court reviewed whether a warning with an 
explicit temporal limitation on the right to an attorney 
withstood Miranda‟s requirements.  In rejecting the 
defendant‟s argument that the warning, as a whole, failed to 
convey his continuous right to counsel, the Court held that 
 
They informed Powell that he had 
the „right to talk to a lawyer 
before answering [their] 
questions‟ and „the right to use 
any of [his] rights at any time [he] 
want[ed] during th[e] interview.‟  
3 
 
The first statement communicated 
that Powell could consult with a 
lawyer before answering any 
particular question, and the 
second statement confirmed that 
he could exercise that right while 
the interrogation was underway.  
In combination, the two warnings 
reasonably conveyed Powell‟s 
right to have an attorney present, 
not only at the outset of the 
interrogation, but at all times.  
 
Id. at 1204-05 (alterations in original).  The Court not only 
took note of the catch all statement, but also relied on it in 
combination with the “before” language in concluding that 
 
In context, however, the term 
“before” merely conveyed when 
Powell‟s right to an attorney 
became effective—namely, before 
he answered any questions at all.  
Nothing in the words used 
indicated that counsel‟s presence 
would be restricted after the 
questioning commenced. 
 
Id. at 1205.  The Court found that the “words used”2 did not 
                                                 
2 To the extent the majority views the reference in Powell to 
“the words used” as only alluding to the “right to speak to an 
attorney before” and not the catch all statement, I disagree 
with that interpretation.  The combination of phrases in 
4 
 
indicate that the presence of Powell‟s counsel would be 
restricted after the questioning commenced because 
“[i]nstead, the warning communicated that the right to 
counsel carried forward to and through the interrogation:  
Powell could seek his attorney‟s advice before responding to 
any of [the officers‟] questions and at any time . . . during 
th[e] interview.”  Id. at 1205 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “The warning” included the catch all statement—
“[y]ou have the right to use any of these rights at any time 
you want during this interview”  Id. at 1200.  Thus, it appears 
that if Powell had not been told that he could invoke the 
rights read to him at any time during questioning, his right to 
the presence of counsel during the interrogation would not 
have been reasonably conveyed.   
 
This is the crux of my disagreement with the majority.  
Powell speaks specifically to the clarity with which the 
warnings inform the accused of his right to counsel 
throughout the interrogative process.  On its face, an iteration 
of the warnings with no elucidation on this point cannot be 
constitutionally sound.   
 
  Ultimately, Powell examines language different than 
that before us.  In this case, the police officer, without a 
Miranda card and from memory, warned Warren of his 
general right to counsel without reference to whether it 
commenced or ceased at any particular time.  Unlike Powell, 
Warren did not receive an explicit warning that all of the 
rights dictated to him could be invoked at any time during the 
entirety of the interview.  Although there is no catch all 
                                                                                                             
Powell made evident that the term “before” was not 
restrictive and it only conveyed when the right began. 
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statement in Warren‟s case, Powell stands for the proposition 
that being told that your right to counsel persists throughout 
interrogation is at the core of Miranda.   
 
The majority concludes that, in light of Powell, the 
lack of any express reference to the right to counsel during 
interrogation, coupled with the lack of a catch all statement 
like that in Powell, does not undermine the validity of the 
warning.  However, simply because the general right to 
counsel here does not contain a qualifier does not mean that 
the warning makes clear that the right to counsel exists both 
before and during questioning.  As we look at the application 
of Miranda, and now Powell, we cannot pare down the 
constitutional prerequisites with wily veterans of our justice 
system in mind.  “[T]he accused who does not know his 
rights and therefore does not make a request may be the 
person who most needs counsel[.]”  Powell, 130 S.Ct. at 1210 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470-71) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Our charge is to make 
sure the words spoken are plain and not subject to conjecture, 
intuition, or speculation. 
 
The majority also points to Duckworth and Prysock 
because in those cases, the Court found that the warnings, in 
their totality, did not limit the right to appointed counsel.  In 
both cases, the Court looked to the language of the warnings 
to discern any temporal limitation on the suspect‟s rights that 
may have been communicated to him.  Although the language 
used in both is distinguishable, these decisions provide 
guidance as to what constitutes adequate notice of the right to 
counsel and its scope.  
  
In Prysock, the Court reviewed a warning that 
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informed the suspect of his right to “have hi[s] [lawyer] 
present with [him] while . . . being questioned, and all during 
the questioning[.]”  453 U.S. at 361.  The defendant 
complained that the warning was inadequate because it 
included “the right to have a lawyer appointed . . . at no cost,”  
id. at 358, but did not explicitly inform him of the right to 
appointed counsel before questioning.  The Court rejected this 
argument, holding that “nothing in the warnings suggested 
any limitation of the right to the presence of appointed 
counsel different from the conveyed rights to a lawyer in 
general, including the right to a lawyer before [the suspect is] 
questioned . . . while [he is] being questioned, and all during 
the questioning.”  Id. at 360-61.   
 
In Duckworth, the Court similarly found sufficient a 
warning that informed the suspect of the right “to talk to a 
lawyer for advice before . . . any questions, and to have him 
with [the suspect] during questioning” but also stated that a 
lawyer would be appointed “if and when [the suspect goes] to 
court.”  492 U.S at 198.  The Court held that the statements, 
“in their totality,” conveyed the proper warnings because the 
“if and when” statement did not suggest that only those 
suspects who go to court would be afforded an attorney, but 
“simply anticipate[d] [the suspect‟s] question.”  Id. at 204-05.  
In the context of both cases, the warnings reasonably 
conveyed to the suspect, through their language of the right to 
counsel during questioning, that the right to counsel indeed 
existed during the time of interrogation. 
   
Although the Court has not “dictated the words in 
which the essential information must be conveyed,” Powell, 
130 S.Ct. at 1204, the language used in the Prysock, 
Duckworth, and Powell is instructive.  Each contained 
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language that the suspect could invoke, at any time during 
questioning, either his right to counsel or all the rights that 
had been dictated to him (including the right to talk to counsel 
before questioning).  Warren‟s warning of his “right to an 
attorney,” in context, does not, in my view, reasonably 
convey to a reasonable person in his position that he has a 
right to counsel throughout any custodial questioning.  
Additionally, the notice to Warren that if he could not afford 
an attorney, one would be appointed to him before 
questioning does not and cannot be said to have reasonably 
conveyed that the general right to an attorney continues 
during questioning.   
 
I believe that Miranda and its progeny compel a 
finding that the conveyance of a general right to an attorney, 
without contextual notification that this right exists during 
questioning, does not meet the requirements of Miranda.  
Many of our sister Circuits have come to similar conclusions.  
See, e.g., United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 614 (9th Cir. 
1984) (the advisement of “the right to have counsel present 
during questioning . . . is not left to the option of the police; it 
is mandated by the Constitution.”);3 see also, Powell, 130 
                                                 
3 
See also United States v. Tillman, 963 F.2d 137, 140-42 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (suppressing statements made to police where 
suspect was told that he had the right to the presence of an 
attorney, but police “failed to convey to defendant that he had 
the right to an attorney both before, during and after 
questioning” and failed to warn that statements could be used 
against him); United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 672-74 
(10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1981) (finding 
Miranda warning insufficient where suspect was not advised 
that “right to counsel encompassed the right to have counsel 
8 
 
S.Ct. at 1212 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I am doubtful that 
warning a suspect of his „right to counsel,‟ without more, 
reasonably conveys a suspect‟s full rights under Miranda . . . 
.”). 
  
In my view, telling a defendant that he will be 
appointed an attorney before questioning if he cannot afford 
one and that he has the right to an attorney does not 
reasonably convey his continued right to counsel during 
questioning.  Looking to the entire warning and what it 
reasonably conveyed, the warning in Powell did not “entirely 
omi[t] any information Miranda required [the officers] to 
impart.”  Id. at 1204 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  I believe such an omission was made in this case.  
Because I conclude that the warning here was inadequate and 
violated Warren‟s constitutional rights under the Fifth 
Amendment, I believe that his statements made subsequent to 
the warning should be suppressed.  I would therefore vacate 
the judgment of conviction and remand to the District Court. 
                                                                                                             
present during any questioning,” but admitting statement as 
harmless error); Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530, 533 
(5th Cir. 1968) (“Merely telling him that he could speak with 
an attorney or anyone else before he said anything at all is not 
the same as informing him that he is entitled to the presence 
of an attorney during interrogation . . . .”).  
